The unexpected challenge that the government had to face in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision to revoke the presidential pardon given to the well-known Buddhist monk Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara would come as a warning about the extra-parliamentary methods that might be used to undermine it. The episode demonstrated that even a government with an overwhelming parliamentary majority is not immune to political pressures that can arise outside Parliament. Leaders who initially attempted to resist the political demands of the Buddhist clergy have often found themselves compelled to retreat or accommodate them when the opposition became too difficult to withstand. This may be one important factor in the emergence of three pieces of legislation intended to strengthen the coercive powers of the state.
The disrobing of Ven. Gnanasara by prison authorities prior to coming before the judiciary became a matter canvassed at the highest levels of the Buddhist clergy. What began as a dispute over the monk’s robe rapidly escalated into demands for a presidential pardon, accompanied by calls for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to resign if he refused to grant one. Opposition political parties mobilised behind these demands, organising public marches and demonstrations in support of the monk. The political use of Buddhism and Sinhalese nationalism has been a feature of Sri Lanka’s modern political history. Few politicians seeking to capture or retain political power have dared to confront this phenomenon head-on.
The experience of Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike is instructive. Having reached an agreement with Tamil leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam in 1957 to address Tamil political grievances through regional councils and the devolution of certain powers, the prime minister came under intense opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces, including Buddhist monks. The protests contributed to his decision to abrogate the agreement. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s experience as both prime minister and president also illustrates the constraints under which political leaders have operated when attempting to advance reconciliation and power-sharing. His peace initiatives and efforts to negotiate a political settlement during his periods in office encountered determined opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces.
Potential vulnerability
The government enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament and has a cohesive group of parliamentarians, making it difficult to challenge through parliamentary means. Its potential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Extra-parliamentary mobilisation could bring together political opponents, religious authorities and sections of the public in ways that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot contain. Three proposed laws on the table, the legislation on Protecting the State from Terrorist Activities, the Prevention of Organised Crimes legislation, and the legislation on NGO Registration and Supervision are all directed at centralising power in the state at the expense of the people’s rights and freedoms. The government may believe that strengthening the powers available to the state will protect its democratic mandate against attempts to destabilise it through violence, organised criminal activity or other forms of extra-parliamentary pressure. There are reasons for a government to be concerned about these possibilities.
Sri Lanka has experienced political violence, terrorism and organised crime, while the mobilisation of communal sentiment has repeatedly undermined democratic institutions and efforts at national reconciliation. A government elected on a promise of system change has every reason to protect its mandate and ensure that the law is applied equally to all citizens. However, the means chosen to protect democracy can also undermine it. Laws that confer broad discretionary powers on the state may be used not only against those who engage in criminal activity but also against political opponents, peaceful protesters, civil society organisations and individuals who criticise the government. The distinction between protecting the state and protecting those who exercise power is crucial.
One area of particular vulnerability concerns the ethnic conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka since independence. It has divided the country’s people and, for a time, divided the country geographically, until it was reunited through military force. The end of the war did not resolve the underlying political grievances or remove the capacity of ethno-religious nationalism to generate hatred and fear. The government faces continuing pressure from the ethnic minority communities and the international community to make progress on controversial issues. These include the demilitarisation of the North and East, the return of land occupied by the military, whether legally or otherwise, and accountability for human rights violations, particularly during the war and at its conclusion. If these issues continue to be treated primarily as security concerns rather than as matters requiring political and institutional reform, the conditions that generated conflict will remain.
Constructive example
The government’s handling of the crisis surrounding Ven. Gnanasara offers an example of how such challenges might be addressed. It is noteworthy that the government has not compromised on the issue of a pardon to the convicted monk. At the same time, it compromised on the question of the robe, introducing rules under which members of the Buddhist clergy would not be disrobed without the authorisation of the relevant religious hierarchy. The dispute appears to have been brought to a peaceful conclusion through negotiations between the government and Buddhist monks, rather than through the use of the coercive power of the state. The government maintained its position on the judicial process while finding a way to resolve the immediate dispute through dialogue. This is the approach that the government may wish to pursue on other fronts if it is to achieve the system change for which it received such strong public support.
The government’s electoral mandate gives it an opportunity to address the problems that have weakened democratic governance, entrenched corruption and perpetuated ethnic divisions. The danger in the government passing the three proposed laws is that, once incorporated into the country’s legal framework, they may be used and abused by governments of different political persuasions. Even a government that introduces legislation with good intentions cannot guarantee how its successors will exercise the powers it creates. Nor can it assume that the institutions responsible for enforcing the law will always interpret those powers in ways that protect democratic freedoms. The Prevention of Terrorism Act provides a sobering precedent. Originally introduced as a temporary measure intended to remain in force for six months, it has endured for decades and remains part of Sri Lanka’s legal framework. Its history illustrates how exceptional powers, once granted to the state, can become entrenched even when the circumstances that originally justified them change. The promise that such powers will be exercised responsibly is not an adequate substitute for legal safeguards.
A government elected to transform the political system, and engage in system change, must be mindful that laws enacted to meet immediate political challenges can outlive the circumstances that prompted them. The ultimate test of system change is not simply whether a government can overcome its opponents. The real measure of its commitment to systemic change will be whether it can resist the temptation to acquire powers that it would not wish a future government to exercise against its own supporters. The government’s objective must not be to create a stronger state capable of suppressing dissent so that it can remain in power. Instead, the government must set its sights on bringing to being a more democratic and accountable state. The state that Sri Lanka needs is one that commands the confidence of all its citizens, protects their rights equally and provides peaceful means of addressing their differences.